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DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [UNSC](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: NCP HAS NO INTENTION OF FUNDING ABYEI, WARNS GOSS OFFICIAL

11. (SBU) CDA Fernandez, AEC Chairman Plumbly and the Dutch Ambassador met with GOSS Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng on March 5 in Khartoum to review the current state of play in the sensitive border area of Abyei and to compare notes on the state of the National Congress Party (NCP) of President Bashir after the March 4th ICC arrest warrant was announced for the President's apprehension.

12. (SBU) Luka said that despite their bluster, the regime is shaken by the IC Annou.cement. @e descRibEd tie\$CR`as0.u-uSu`LnQQ*eor)gma`" uIli0sUg@kfQrhe cayo,qQ-q#.fYaalQ mov(v)fAU0MQKPoJQn0WB{SyygfQTfQc.|eome&(decided by a small and secretive "Lijnat Ijra'at" made up of senior SAF, NISS and Interior Ministry officials with external affairs officials from the NCP (but not from the SPLM-headed Foreign Ministry). The list they prepared has more than the 10-16 NGOs expelled or dissolved so far.

13. (SBU) Moving on to Abyei, Biong Deng said that, despite protestations to the contrary, "the NCP mindset is not to release money for Abyei" because that would strengthen the nascent SPLM administration in the area. At first the NCP blocked funding because they thought it might strengthen the SPLM's legal claim before the Permanent Court of Administration, VP Taha had explained to Finance Minister Al-Jaz and others that this was not the case, but now "they have no intention and furthermore, they have no money."

14. (SBU) Despite his skepticism, Luka agreed to the diplomats' entreaties that the Abyei Interim Administrator needs to engage more forcefully on what limited resources can be squeezed out of Khartoum for Abyei, such as the long-promised 10 landcruisers for the local government and salaries for the Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU). JIPU commanders also need to spend more time on the ground instead of Juba or Khartoum. Luka said that the SPLM has an inherent assumption that Abyei should be treated like a state so it deserves more resources. The SPLM had agreed to an NCP proposal for setting up a joint technical committee to review proposed Abyei civil service positions.

15. (SBU) Despite the NCP stonewalling, Luka admitted that the SPLM needed to do more: Abyei Interim Administrator Arop Majok and the SPLM's Minister of State for Finance in Khartoum, Lual Deng, should be allies but actually detest each other. Luka added that even a very small functioning government on the ground would move things forward. Arop could not come yet to Khartoum because he was trying to maintain calm in the turbulent area where the NCP may have been encouraging local Misseriyya Arabs to act aggressively in conjunction with the ICC announcement. Biong Deng agreed to press Arop to come to Khartoum and engage with the regime's financial officials, "even if they don't intend to play fair, we must continue to engage."

16. (SBU) Luka asked for US help in perhaps finding Bearing Point support for Abyei's interim administration in things like financial management, capacity building and project writing. CDA Fernandez responded that he would pass that request on to USAID but underscored the devastating effect the expulsion of major NGOs from Darfur would have on the three areas and Abyei in particular since several of them, such as PADCO and Mercy Corps, were quite important in Abyei. Major development partners have just lost their presence in "North" Sudan and this absence will set back development projects that will help the SPLM in a crucial election year. Luka agreed and noted that Salva Kiir's first response when he heard about the expulsions was "how can they do this without even telling us?"

17. (SBU) Comment: The SPLM is in the near impossible position of having to engage and coordinate with the NCP closely in order to preserve the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement while the regime increasingly confronts the West over Darfur and the ICC. Luka noted Salva Kiir's "near escape" from being hoisted onto a platform with the now wanted President for March 5th's "million man" demonstration of rage against the West and the ICC. The GOSS's internal financial crisis makes the SPLM even more vulnerable to NCP subversion and blandishments. Both on Abyei and on the South in general, the West and the United States in particular must find additional, creative measures to demonstrate our tangible, ongoing support for the CPA, the GOSS and the SPLM in Sudan's current dangerous situation of hyper-volatility.

FERNANDEZ